Security organizations often attempt to disrupt terror or insurgent networks by targeting "high value targets" (HVT's). However, there have been numerous examples that illustrate how such networks are able to quickly re-generate leadership after such an operation. Here, we introduce the notion of a shaping operation in which the terrorist network is first targeted for the purpose of reducing its leadership re-generation ability before targeting HVT's. We look to conduct shaping by maximizing the network-wide degree centrality through node removal. We formally define this problem and prove solving it is NP-Complete. We introduce a greedy heuristic for to approximate this problem. We implement the greedy heuristic and found in examining five real-world terrorist networks that removing only 12% of nodes can increase the network-wide centrality between 17% and 45%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Terrorist and insurgent networks are known for their ability to regenerate leadership after targeted attacks. For example, the infamous Al Qaeda in Iraq terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed on June 8th, 2006 1 only to be replaced with Abu Ayyub al-Masri about a week later. 2 Here, we introduce the notion of a shaping operation in which the terrorist network is first targeted for the purpose of reducing its leadership re-generation ability. Such shaping operations would then be followed by normal attacks against high value targets -however the network would be less likely to recover due to the initial shaping operations. In this paper, we look to shape such networks by increasing network-wide centrality, first introduced in [1] . Intuitively, this measure provides insight into the criticality of high-degree nodes. Hence, a network with a low network-wide centrality is a more decentralized organization and likely to regenerate leadership. In the shaping operations introduced in this paper, we seek to target nodes that will maximize this measure -making follow-on attacks against leadership more effective. Previous work has primarily dealt with the problem of leadership regeneration by focusing on individuals likely to emerge as new leaders [2] . However, targeting or obtaining information about certain individuals may not always be possible. Hence, in this paper, we target nodes that affect the reduce the network's ability regenerate leadership as a whole.
The main contributions of this paper is the introduction of a formal problem we call FRAGILITY (Section II) which seeks to find a set of nodes whose removal would maximize the network-wide centrality. We also included in the problem a "no strike list" -nodes in the network that cannot be targeted for various reasons. This is because real-world targeting of terrorist or insurgent networks often includes restrictions against certain individuals. We also prove that this problem is NPcomplete (and the associated optimization problem is NP-hard) which means that an efficient algorithm to solve it optimally is currently unknown. We then provide two algorithms for solving this problem (Section III). We introduce a greedy heuristic that we show experimentally (in Section IV) to provide good results in practice (as we demonstrate on six different real-world terrorist networks). In examining five realworld terrorist networks, we found that successful targetting operations against only 12% (or less) of nodes can increase the network-wide centrality between 17% and 45%. Additionally, we discuss related work further in Section V.
We would like to note that the targeting of individuals in a terrorist or insurgent network does not necessarily mean to that they should be killed. In fact, for "shaping operations" as the ones described in this paper, the killing of certain individuals in the network may be counter-productive. This is due to the fact that the capture of individuals who are likely emergent leaders may provide further intelligence on the organization in question.
II. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES AND COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
We assume that an undirected social network is represented by the graph G = (V, E). Additionally, we assume a "no strike" set, S ⊆ V . Intuitively, these are nodes in a terrorist/insurgent network that cannot be targeted. This set is a key part of our framework, as real-world targeting of terrorist and/or insurgents in a terrorist/insurgent network is often accompanied by real-world constraints. For example, consider the following:
• We may know an individual's relationships in the terrorist/insurgent network, but may not have enough information (i.e. where he or she may reside, enough evidence, etc.) to actually target him or her. • The potential target may be politically sensitive. • The potential target may have fled the country or area of operations but still maintains his or her role in the terrorist/insurgent network through electronic communication. • The potential "target" may actually be a source of intelligence and/or part of an ongoing counter-intelligence operation (i.e. as described in [3] ).
Throughout this paper we will also use the following notation. The symbols N G , M G will denote the sizes of V, E respectively. For each i ∈ V , we will use d i to denote the degree of that node (the number of individuals he/she is connected to) and η i to denote the set of neighbors and we extend this notation for subsets of V (for V ⊆ V, η(V ) = i∈V η i ). We will use the notation κ i to denote all edges in E that are adjacent to node i and the notation d * G to denote the maximum degree of the network. Given some subset V ⊆ V , we will use the notation G(V ) to denote the subgraph of G induced by V . We describe an example network in Example 2.1.
Example 2.1: Consider network G sam in Figure 1 . Nodes a and b may be leaders of a strategic cell that provides guidance to attack cells (nodes c-f and g-j). Note that no members in the attack cells are linked to each other. Also note that if node a is the leader, and targeted, he could easily be replaced by b.
A. Network-Wide Degree Centrality
We now introduce the notion of network-wide degree centrality as per [1] . The key intuition of this paper is to use this centrality as a measure of the network's ability to re-generate leadership.
Definition 2.1 (Network-Wide Degree Centrality [1] ): The degree centrality of a network G, denoted C G is defined as:
We note that there are other types of network-wide centrality (i.e. network-wide betweenness, closeness, etc.). We leave the consideration of these alternate definitions of network-wide centrality to future work. Freeman [1] shows that for a star network, the quantity i d * G − d i equals (N G − 1)(N G − 2) -and this is the maximum possible value for this quantity. Hence, the value for C G can be at most 1. As this equation is clearly always positive, network-wide degree centrality is a scalar in [0, 1]. Turning back to Example 2.1, we can compute C Gsam = 0.38 -which seems to indicate that in this particular terrorist/insurgent network that, after leadership is targeted, there is a cadre of second-tier individuals who can eventually take control of the organization. Throughout this paper, we find it useful to manipulate Equation 1 as follows.
We notice that the centrality of a network really depends on three things: number of nodes, number of edges, and the highest degree of any node in the network. We leverage this re-arranged equation in many of our proofs. Further, we will use the function fragile G : V → to denote the level of network-wide of the graph after some set of nodes is removed. Hence, fragile G (V ) = C G(V −V ) . We note that this function has some interesting characteristics. For example, for some subset
Hence, fragile G is not necessarily sub-or super-modular either. Consider Example 2.2.
Example 2.2: Consider the network G sam in Figure 1 .
illustrate that fragile Gsam is not necessarily monotonic or anti-monotonic. Now let us consider the incremental increase of adding an additional element. Adding a to ∅ causes fragile Gsam to increase by 0.24 while adding a to {b} ⊃ ∅ causes fragile Gsam to decrease by 0.57 -implying submodularity. However, adding c to ∅ causes fragile Gsam to decrease by 0.03 while adding c to set {a, b} ⊃ ∅ causes fragile Gsam to increase by 0.1 (as fragile Gsam ({a, b, c} = 0.1) -implying super-modularity. Hence, fragile Gsam is not necessarily sub-or super-modular.
B. Problems and Complexity Results
We now have all the pieces to introduce our problems of interest. We include decision and optimization versions.
As our problems seek to find sets of nodes, rather than individual ones, it raises the question of "how difficult are these problems." We prove that F RAGILIT Y is NP-Complete -meaning an efficient algorithm to solve it optimally is currently unknown. Following directly from this result is the NP-hardness of F RAGILIT Y OP T . Below we state and prove this result.
Now with the problems and their complexity identified, we proceed to develop algorithms to solve them. In this paper, we use a greedy heuristic. Though we cannot guarantee that the greedy heuristic provides an optimal solution, it often provides a natural approach to approximating many NP-hard optimization problems. The ideas is to iteratively pick the node in the network that provides the greatest increase in fragile -and does not cause a decrease.
The following two propositions describe characteristics of the output and run-time of GREEDY F RAGILE, respectively. Figure 1 , suppose a user wants to identify 3 nodes that will cause the network to become "as fragile as possible" and is able to target any node. Hence, he would like to solve F RAGILE OP T (3, G sam , ∅) and decides to do so using GREEDY F RAGILE. Initially, fragile Gsam (∅) = 0.33. In the first iteration, it selects and removes node a, increasing the fragility (fragile Gsam ({a}) =
if curScore ≥ curBestScore then 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
All experiments were run on a computer equipped with an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU T9550 processor operating at 2.66 GHz (only one core was used). The machine was running Microsoft Windows 7 (32 bit) and equipped with 4.0 GB of physical memory. We implemented the GREEDY FRAGILE algorithm using Python 2.6 in under 30 lines of code that leveraged the NetworkX library available from http://networkx.lanl.gov/.
We compared the results of the GREEDY FRAGILE to three other more traditional approaches to targeting that rely on centrality measures from the literature. Specifically, we look at the top closeness and betweenness nodes in the network. Given node i, its closeness is the inverse of the average shortest path length from node i to all other nodes in the graph. Betweenness, on the other hand, is defined as the number of shortest paths between node pairs that pass through i. Formal definitions of both of these measures can be found in [4] .
A. Datasets
We studied the effects of our algorithm on five different datasets. The network Tanzania collected from newspaper accounts by subject matter experts in the field. The remainder networks, GenTerrorNw1-GenTerrorNw4 are terrorist networks generated from realworld classified datasets [6] , [7] . The Tanzania and the Gen-TerrorNw1-GenTerrorNw4 datasets used in our analysis were multi-modal networks, meaning they contain multiple node classes such as Agents, Resources, Locations, etc. The presence of the different node classes generate multiple or meta networks, which, in their original state, do not provide the single-mode Agent by Agent network needed to test our algorithms. Johnson and McCulloh [8] demonstrated a mathematical technique to convert meta networks into singlemode networks without losing critical information. Using this methodology, we were able to derive distant relationships between nodes as a series of basic matrix algebra operations on all five networks. The result is an agent based social network of potential terrorist. Characteristics of the transformed networks of agent node class only can be found in Table I .
B. Increasing the Fragility of Networks
In our experiments, we showed that our algorithm was able to significantly increase the network-wide degree centrality by removing nodes -hence increasing the fragile function with respect to a given network. In each of the five real-world terrorist networks that we examined, removal of only 12% of nodes can increase the network-wide centrality between 17% and 45% (see Figures 3-7) . In Figure 2 we show a visualization of how the Tanzania network becomes more "star-like" with subsequent removal of nodes by the greedy algorithm.
For comparison, we also looked at the removal of high degree, closeness, and betweenness nodes. Removal of highdegree, closeness, or betweenness nodes tended to increase the network-wide centrality. In other words, traditional efforts of targeting leadership without first conducting shaping operations may actually increase the organization's ability to regenerate leadership -as such targeting operations effectively cause an organization to de-centralize. We display these results graphically in Figures 3-7 . Notice that GREEDY FRAGILE consistently causes an increase in the network-wide degree centrality. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) reveals that there is a significant difference in the performance among our algorithm and the centrality measures with respect to increase or decrease in network-wide degree centrality (pvalue less than 2.2 · 10 −16 , calculated with R version 2.13). Visualization of the Tanzania network after nodes removed by GREEDY FRAGILE. Panel A shows the original network. Panel B shows the network after 3 nodes are removed, panel C shows the network after 5 nodes are removed, and panel D shows the network after 9 nodes are removed. Notice that the network becomes more "star-like" after subsequent node removals. In our experiment, after GREEDY FRAGILE removed 11 of the nodes in the network, it took the topology of a star.
Additionally, pairwise analysis conducted using Tukey's Honest Significant Difference (HSD) test indicates that the results of our algorithm differ significantly from any of the three centrality measures with a probability approaching 1.0 (95% confidence, calculated with R version 2.13). Typically, the ratio of percent increase in fragility to the percent of removed nodes is typically 2 : 1 or greater. 
C. Runtime
We also evaluated the run-time of the GREEDY FRAGILE algorithm. With the largest terror network considered (Gen-TerrorNw4), we achieved short runtime (under 7 seconds) on standard commodity hardware (see Figure 8 ). Hence, in terms of runtime, our algorithm is practical for use by a real-world analyst. As predicted in our time complexity result, we found that the runtime of GREEDY FRAGILE increases with the number of nodes removed. We note that the implementations of top degree, closeness, and betweenness calculate those measures for the entire network at once -hence increasing the number of nodes to remove does not affect their runtime.
V. RELATED WORK
Various aspects of the resiliency of terrorist networks have been previously explored in the literature. For instance, [9] studies the ability such network to facilitate communication while maintaining secrecy while [10] studies how such networks are resilient to cascades. However, to our knowledge, the network-wide degree centrality in such networks -and how to increase this property -has not been previously studied.
There has been much work dealing with the removal of nodes from a network to maximize fragmentation [11] , [12] , [13] where the nodes removed are mean to either increase fragmentation of the network or reduce the size of the largest connected component. While this work has many applications, it is important to note that there are special considerations of terrorist and insurgent networks that we must account for in a targeting strategy. For instance, if conducting a counterintelligence operation while targeting, as in the case of [3] , it may be desirable to preserve some amount of connectivity in the network. Additionally, fragmentation of a network may result in the splintering of an organization into smaller, but more radical and deadly organizations. This happens because in some cases, it may be desirable to keep certain terrorist or insurgent leaders in place to restrain certain, more radical elements of their organization. Such splinter was observed for the insurgent organization Jaysh al-Mahdi in Iraq [14] . Further, these techniques do not specifically address the issue of emerging leaders. Hence, if they were to be used for counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency, they would likely still benefit from a shaping operation to reduce organization's ability to regenerate leadership.
There has been some previous work on identifying emerging leaders in terrorist networks. Although such an approach could be useful in identifying certain leaders, it does not account the organizations ability as a whole to regenerate leadership. In [2] , the topic of cognitive demand is studied. The cognitive load of an individual deals with their ability to handle multiple demands on their time and work on complex tasks. Typically, this can be obtained by studying networks where the nodes may represent more than individual people -but tasks, events, and responsibilities. However, it may often be the case that this type of information is often limited or non-existent in many situations. Additionally, as discussed throughout this paper, the targeting of individual nodes may often not be possible for various reasons. Hence, our framework, that focuses on the network's ability to regenerate leadership as opposed to finding individual emerging leaders may be more useful as we can restrict the available nodes in our search using the "no strike list." By removing these nodes from targeting consideration -but by still considering their structural role -our framework allows a security force to reduce the regenerative ability of a terror network by "working around" individuals that may not be targeted.
In more recent work [15] looks at the problem of removing leadership nodes from a terrorist or criminal network in a manner that accounts for new links created in the aftermath of an operation. Additionally, [16] look at identifying leaders in covert terrorist network who attempt to minimize their communication due to the clandestine nature of their operations. They do this by introducing a new centrality measure called "covertness centrality." Both of these approaches are complementary to ours as they focus on the leadership of the terrorist or insurgent group -as this approach focuses on the networks ability to re-generate leadership. A more complete integration of this approach leadership targeting method such as these (i.e. using a network-wide version of covertness centrality) is an obvious direction for future work.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we described how to target nodes in a terrorist or insurgent network as part of a shaping operation designed to reduce the organization's ability to regenerate leadership. Our key intuition was to increase the network-wide degree centrality which would likely have the effect of eliminating emerging leaders as maximizing this quantity would intuitively increase the organization's reliance on a single leader. In this paper, we found that though identifying a set of nodes to maximize this network-wide degree centrality is NP-hard, our greedy approach proved to be a viable heuristic for this problem, increasing this quantity between 17% − 45% in our experiments. Future work could include an examination of other types of network-wide centrality -for instance networkwide closeness centrality -instead of network-wide degree centrality. Another aspect that we are considering in ongoing research is determining the effectiveness of the shaping strategy when we have observed only part of the terrorist or insurgent organization -as is often the case as such networks are created from intelligence data.
